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INThODUCTHON

Pharmaceutical Innovation:
Law & the Public's Health
Kevin Outterson

At

exceeded $750 billion., Unlike most medical
products
andglobal
services,
many pharmaceutilast count,
pharmaceutical
spending
cals are sold at a price that greatly exceeds marginal
cost. AIDS medicines that retail for over $10,000 per
person per year in the United States can be produced
generically at a marginal cost of less than $150. Patents and other related IP rights create these significant
gaps between marginal cost and retail price, generating many billions of dollars in profits (patent rents) for
2
companies.
Patent rents lead to two conditions without fail.
On a static basis, patent rents price some users out of
the market, an economic deadweight loss. When the
product is the latest Hannah Montana song, perhaps
the global community can bear with the deprivation.
When the product is a life-saving medicine, deadweight losses quickly translate into dead patients. Paul
Hunt, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the right to health estimated that
Almost 2 billion people lack access to essential
medicines. Improving access to existing medicines
could save 10 million lives each year, 4 million
of them in Africa and South-East Asia. Access to
medicines is characterised by profound global
inequity. 15% of the world's population consumes
over 90% of the world's pharmaceuticals.3
Patent rents also propel innovation, enabling drug
companies to protect their investments in R&D. Innovation is the dynamic case for patent rents. While
Kevin Outterson J.D., LL.M., is an Associate Professor of
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empirical research suggests that patents are an ineffective incentive for innovation generally, patents retain
their paradigmatic function in the pharmaceutical and
chemistry industries.4 The drug industry estimates
their global R&D expenditures to have been $65.3 billion in 2008.5 While many suggest that this number
may be inflated for public relations purposes, it does
represent an upper bound estimate. More troubling
has been the relatively poor output in recent years
from the pharmaceutical R&D apparatus - fewer
truly innovative drugs are reaching consumers, for a
variety of reasons. Biomedical R&D is a global business with important impacts on global health, as well
as significant inefficiencies and dramatic problems
with equitable access to innovative therapies.
In this context, the Journal of Law, Medicine 0
Ethics issued a Call for Abstracts on topics related to
pharmaceutical and medical device innovation. We
insisted on an open Call, hoping for a wider variety of
papers and viewpoints on an important topic to global
public health. As such, we received submissions from
a remarkably cross-disciplinary group of authors. The
papers are divided into two sections.
The first collection includes five general papers
from a wide range of perspectives on pharmaceutical
innovation, and two review essays, with a common
focus on pharmaceutical patents. Most of the authors
seek to balance the competing objectives of access and
innovation.
The first paper evaluates the relative efficiency of
non-profit and commercial pharmaceutical R&D.
Aaron Kesselheim and Jerry Avorn, both physicians at
Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, analyzed 25 years of patent data to assess
the relative contributions of private and public funding sources in pharmaceutical innovation. 6 Dr. Kes-
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selheim is also a patent attorney. They found pharmaceutical patents from non-profit sources to enjoy
a statistically significant advantage in quality, as measured by citations. Drug-related patents generated in
the non-profit sector appear to be more valuable than
commercial patents, which supports the importance
of non-profit research institutions in the pharmaceutical sector generally. Their findings also underscore
the significant overall contributions by the commercial sector to pharmaceutical patenting.
In the second article, Sean Flynn (American University, Washington College of Law), Aidan Hollis
(University of Calgary, Department of Economics),
and Mike Palmedo (American University, Washington College of Law) develop a complex and compelling economic case for expanding the use of compulsory licenses in developing countries to expand access
without harming innovation.7 The key to their analysis
is the simple observation that each country's demand
elasticity for pharmaceuticals will differ, often radically
so. Richer countries will be less price-sensitive; poorer
countries will necessarily suffer more convex demand
curves. The implications of their work for global pharmaceutical pricing are significant, directly undermining the supposition that all countries should pay similar prices or strike similar bargains with intellectual
property law. Pricing and patent rules that might be
appropriate for wealthier countries will, according
to their work, be inappropriate or even immoral in
resource constrained settings. They analyze data from
Norway and South Africa to demonstrate these points.
One patent flexibility they highlight is the compulsory
license, a mechanism that has been highly criticized by
patent-based drug companies, but finds clear support
in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. The article by
Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo may move the debate onto
firmer ground, which is welcome news indeed.
The next two articles are critical of compulsory
licenses by developing countries, for somewhat different reasons. The article by Robert C. Bird (University of Connecticut, School of Business) acknowledges
the legality of and need for compulsory licenses, but
expresses strong concerns about their unwanted side
effects, especially the strong negative reactions elicited
from patent-based drug companies and Western governments (particularly the United States)." Bird earned
both J.D. and M.B.A. degrees, which is evident in his
analysis. Bird's concerns are with process and outcomes:
he wants to maximize the public health impact of this
patent strategy. In the fourth article, Dr. Kristina M.
Lybecker (Colorado College, Department of Economics and Business) and Elisabeth Fowler (World Health
Advocacy) make a much more fundamental criticism of
compulsory licenses, especially as recently practiced by

Thailand.9 They find little to recommend from the Thai
process, even if it technically complies with WTO rules
(which they do not concede). Reading these three articles together gives one a clear sense of the controversy in
global pharmaceutical markets concerning compulsory
licensure.
The final article in the first section is by Jorn Sonderholm, a philosopher. He discusses a novel intellectual property right to promote antibiotic development,
the "wild card" patent.10 Historically, patent rewards
have been inalterably linked to the value of the patented invention. The patent was valuable only to the
extent that the public wanted to purchase the patented
product. Sonderholm proposes to disconnect patent
rewards from the underlying invention, giving drug
companies a wild card as a prize if they reach a particular goal (in this particular case, a novel antibiotic).
The wild card is particularly valuable because it can
then be used to extend the patent of any other product, such as Lipitor. Sonderholm finds this arrangement to be valuable as an innovation incentive, while
critics suggest this idea is an inefficient tax on heart
disease to pay for antibiotic R&D. In a broader context, Sonderholm's article illustrates some of the "out
of the box" thinking that makes this field so exciting.
As guest editor of this symposium issue, I was pleased
to have this first set of articles, but hoped for a more
coherent overview of the strengths and weaknesses of
pharmaceutical innovation issues, including compulsory licensure. Two eminent experts agreed to write
essays reviewing several of the articles on compulsory
licensure and wild card patents. Jerome H. Reichman,
a distinguished professor at Duke University School of
Law, agreed to review the articles by Flynn, Hollis, and
Palmedo; Bird; and Lybecker and Fowler." The second
review article is authored by Amy Kapczynski, assistant professor of law at the University of California,
Berkeley. Kapczynski is a renowned expert in licensing
pharmaceutical innovations for global health access.
She agreed to review Sonderholm; Flynn, Hollis, and
Palmedo; and Bird.12 Reichman's review begins with
an authoritative history of compulsory licensure and
the TRIPS Agreement, and proceeds to offer a clear
critique of the three articles on compulsory licensure.
Reichman finds Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo's views to
be closest to his own. Kapczynski also discusses compulsory licensure, to similar effect, but adds her critique
of Sonderholm's wild card proposal. She concludes that
"now is not the time for half measures or an extension
of business as usual," calling for fundamental policy
changes on behalf of global health.
The second section of this symposium narrows the
focus from global health to pharmaceutical innovation
problems with special populations. Elizabeth Weeks
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Leonard examines the terminally ill, who may demand
access to experimental drugs. 13 While many have written about the ethics of the AbigailAlliance litigation,
Professor Weeks (University of Kansas School of Law)
takes it a step further by exploring the dynamic consequences of opening treatment access for the terminally
ill - namely, undercutting future double-blind clinical
trials. Patients may or may not have an autonomy right
to threaten their own health; threatening the clinical
research enterprise for all patients is another matter
altogether. Weeks appropriately expands the range
of concerns expressed in Abigail Alliance to include
future patients and yet-to-be discovered innovation.
Barbara Noah focuses on children as patients and
pharmaceutical research subjects.' As she notes,
children are not "miniature adults,' but people with
unique clinical and ethical needs. U.S. law offers additional incentives and protections for pharmaceutical research with pediatric populations, but much
remains to be done. Most pediatric prescriptions are
not supported by peer-reviewed evidence, and pediatric clinical trials are more difficult to design and
execute. Noah, a Professor of Law at Western New
England College School of Law, gives us a concise but
reliable guide to this regulatory landscape.
One very special population is those afflicted with
Chagas, a parasitic disease endemic to South and Central America. Diseases like Chagas are often neglected
by global commercial enterprises due to the poverty of
the afflicted. In WHO parlance, Chagas is a Type III
very neglected disease, and for-profit companies cannot be expected be responsive. Sara Crager and Matt
Price approach the problem with clinical intensity,
and break free from existing R&D paradigms to fashion a novel solution for this neglected disease.' 5 The
solution they articulate is a prize fund for a Chagas
vaccine, with remarkable sophistication and detail in
their analysis.
In the Call for Abstracts, the JournalofLaw, Medicine E Ethics specifically requested papers on medical device topics, understanding that this important
area was grossly underexplored by scholars. Bruce
Patsner (University of Houston Law Center) gives us
an account of R&D in medical devices, post-Riegel v.
Medtronic,Inc.'6 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld federal pre-emption of state tort law for certain categories of medical devices. Today, drug and
device law have moved further apart due to the different regulatory schemes, tort rules, and their effects on
incentives to innovate. Dr. Patsner (a physician and a
lawyer) explores the relationships between the regulatory structure, tort claims, and future innovation in
the field. Many times we assume that drug and device
incentives are similar, often without specific analysis
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of the device market. Dr. Patsner illustrates the need
to dig into the details of medical devices, rather than
just make broad assumptions.
Indeed, this lesson applies across the entire field of
biomedical innovation, as this symposium issue aptly
demonstrates.
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